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Abstract 
 
This study uses a new dataset to provide comparative gaps, benchmarking with best 
performers and policy syndromes of growth quality in 93 developing countries with data for 
the period 1990-2011. Sigma and Beta estimation strategies are used to provide between and 
within cross-country dispersions. The empirical evidence is based on: time, regions, income 
levels, resource-wealth, state fragility and time-consistent growth quality (GQ) performance.  
First, for ‘within dispersions’ the following outcomes are established: (1) GQ dispersions 
within fundamental characteristics have been decreasing over time, (2) From a time-dynamic 
view, countries within Asia and the Pacific have experienced the highest reduction in GQ 
differences while nations in the Middle East and  North Africa (Central and Eastern 
European) region have witnessed the highest (lowest) differences, (3) From an income 
perspective, upper-middle-income (Low-income) countries have the lowest (highest) 
differences in GQ.  (4) Resource-rich and Non-fragile countries have higher differences 
relative to their Resource-poor and Fragile counterparts respectively. Second, for ‘between 
dispersions’ and policy syndromes, we found two time-consistent extremities. (1) In 
decreasing need of policy intervention, the following are apparent for the Policy syndrome 
extreme: Hopeful, Fragile, Sub-Saharan African, Low-income and Resource-rich countries. 
(2)  In the same line of policy inference, the following are apparent for the Syndrome-free 
extreme: Central and Eastern European, Asia and the Pacific, Latin American, Best 
Performing and Upper-middle-income countries. Their predispositions are clarified and policy 
implications discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: O40; O57; I10; I20; I32 
Keywords: Quality of growth; Development; Catch-up. 
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1. Introduction 
 “Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer” 
(Lewis, 1955).  With growing evidence of “immiserizing growth” (Bhagwati, 1958)1, there is 
some consensus in the inclusive growth literature on the crucial role of inequality in poverty-
growth transformations (Adams, 2004; Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007; Fosu, 2011, 2015; 
Thorbecke, 2013). Accordingly, the narratives are broadly consistent with the need for policy 
to critically employ growth elasticity instruments (Adam, 2004). These include, inter alia:  the 
role of income distribution in poverty mitigation (Ali & Thorbecke, 2000; Datt & Ravallion, 
1992; Kakwani, 1993) and the relevance of inequality in the responses of poverty to growth 
(Fosu, 2015; Easterly, 2000; Ravallion, 1997; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu, 
2016).  
 Studies substantiating the above narratives range from African nations (Fosu, 2008, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b) to broader samples of developing economies (Fosu, 2010c). These 
studies are in accordance with Lewis (1955) on the imperative for policy to emphasise 
inequality rather than  growth in the fight against poverty: “The study finds that the 
responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 
818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the 
inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 
2010c, p. 1432), and “In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of 
growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given 
level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11).  
 If we take a minimalistic view that growth enhances processes of industrialisation, 
then the conjectures of Fosu converge with Piketty’s celebrated ‘Capital in the 21st century’ 
                                                 
1
 Substantial negative externalities could accompany economic growth. Hence, improvements in production 
possibilities could also lead to disequalizing income distribution. This tendency contradicts Kuznets’ (1955, 
1971) conjectures on an inverted-U shape nexus between industrialisation and inequality. There is considerable 
evidence with which to debunk Kuznets’ theories in developing countries (Asongu, 2016). 
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(Piketty, 2014) on the need  for policy to focus more on inequality reduction in charting the 
course of industrialisation (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016). This 
convergence is also consistent with a growing body of literature on achieving post-2015 
objectives of inclusive and sustainable development (Ozgur et al., 2013; Timmons et al., 
2009; Monika & Bobbin, 2012; Bagnara, 2012; Miller, 2014; Singh, 2014).  
In response to these growing narratives, a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
publication has proposed a Quality of Growth Index (QGI)2. Accordingly, the Mlachila et al. 
(2014) index for developing countries encompasses both the social dimensions and the 
intrinsic nature of growth. This interesting study leaves room for improvement in at least three 
main areas. First, the paper concludes that the convergence rate among developing nations is 
relatively slow. Indeed as documented by recent catch-up literature, convergence among a 
very heterogeneous set of countries is unlikely to occur (Narayan, 2011, p. 2773; Islam, 1995; 
Asongu, 2013a, p. 46). Second, in the same line of thought, the quality of growth (hence QG) 
determinants presented in Table 3) may vary across non-homogenous panels. Hence, blanket 
policies may not be appropriate unless they are contingent with fundamental characteristics of 
QG. Third, while the underlying study3 presents the state of QG in developing countries, 
policy recommendations often revolve around more interesting insights like gaps in QG for 
policy syndromes so that countries with the highest gaps or dispersions relative to the 
benchmarks (or best performers) are entitled to receive more attention.  
The present paper aims to fill the above gaps by using fundamental characteristics 
documented in the underlying study to address the three issues identified above4. The deep 
concerns that matter to us in tackling the issues arise from four practical questions. (1) Are 
determinants of growth quality (GQ) different across central characteristics of advancement in 
                                                 
2
 See September 16th 2014 IMF publication:  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41922.0   
3
 We shall use the term ‘underlying study’ with Mlachila et al (2014) interchangeably throughout the paper.  
4
 The fundamental characteristics or homogenous panels documented in Figures 2-3 and Figure 4.   
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developing countries? (2) What are the convergence and catch-up dynamics in GQ within 
fundamental panels? (3) What are the gaps between fundamental panels when benchmarked 
with best performers? (4) What are the resulting policy syndromes? 
To be sure, answers to the above questions contribute to bridging the identified gaps in 
at least three main ways. First, using comparative determinants based on five criteria which 
represent seventeen fundamental characteristics, we are able to complement the issue of 
heterogeneity in determinants which is shown in  Table 3. Second, more evidence on the 
convergence hypothesis complements the slim indication of catch-up provided in Table 2 of 
the underpinning study. Third, for an in depth assessment, GQ gaps are examined with the 
more robust methodology of convergence and benchmarks which are used to identify policy 
syndromes.  
While the last-three contributions above stand-out boldly, some criticisms might arise 
on the robustness of the first contribution. Accordingly, in this underlying paper determinants 
of GQ have been documented with regard to some fundamental characteristics (Appendix 9). 
We improve the comparative determinants in at least three ways: First, involving ‘aggregate 
institutional quality’, ‘rule of law’ and corruption-control in the same specification results in 
multicollinearity and overparameterization issues that could substantially bias estimated 
coefficients. Second, we decompose the social spending variable into its health and 
educational components to provide more policy options. Third, while the underlying study 
provides seven comparative sub-panels, we extend them to seventeen. Accordingly, limiting 
the comparison to only one dimension of some criteria may not be exhaustive enough for 
policy. Moreover, we add some documented but unexploited homogenous characteristics of 
Quality of Growth Index (QGI) performance: Hopefuls, Contenders and Best Performers.   
The richness of the dataset has enabled us to disaggregate the information into five 
fundamental characteristics. These are based on: non-overlapping intervals (1990-1994; 1995-
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1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-2011); regions (Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), Asia and the Pacific (AP), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Latin 
America (LA)); income levels (Low-income (LIC), Middle-income (MIC), Lower-middle-
income (LMIC) and Upper-middle-income (UMIC); resource-wealth (Resource-rich (RR), 
Resource-poor (RP)); State fragility (Fragile (Frag) and Non-Fragile (Non-Fragile) countries) 
and GQ performance over time (Hopefuls [Hope]), Contenders [Cont]) and Best performers 
[Best]).  
This analytical procedure entails two main steps. First, the catch-up and convergence 
patterns are investigated using beta and sigma methodologies for panel and cross-sectional 
specifications respectively5. Both the absolute and conditional versions of beta convergence 
are provided. Second, benchmarking and ‘further identification of gaps’ are used to provide 
the policy syndromes which are much needed for heterogeneous policy initiatives.  
As to  the anxiety that may arise on the publication status of the paper motivating this 
inquiry, justifications are presented in Section 2. We understand this study may contravene 
some scientific orthodoxy because it is not positioned as an extension of a paper published in 
a journal. The concerns that matter to us are the practical questions and gaps in the literature 
discussed above. To these ends, we aim to exploit a new database, freshly available to the 
scientific community in order to provide policy implications on some important, urgent and 
pressing issues.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents concepts and 
measurements of pro-poor growth and intuitions for the empirics. The data and methodology 
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the results. 
Concluding implications and further research directions are covered in Section 5.  
 
                                                 
5
 While it is more technically correct to refer to ‘beta catch-up’ and ‘sigma convergence’ because the former is a 
condition for the latter, we shall use ‘beta and “sigma” convergence’ interchangeably throughout the paper.  
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2. Concepts of pro-poor growth and intuition for the empirics  
As discussed in the introductory section, there has been a growing strand in the literature on 
rising inequality as a challenge to 21st century capitalism (Brada & Bah, 2014) and its 
implications for global economic prosperity (IMF, 2007) and social order (Milanovic, 2010). 
Two important dimensions in this stream of research have been the measurements and 
determinants of inclusive growth (Anand et al., 2013). Anand et al. (2013) have proposed an 
indicator of inclusive growth which captures both the distribution and pace of economic 
growth. Motivated by the intuition that for growth to mitigate poverty in a sustainable manner 
it has to be inclusive (Kraay, 2004; Berg et al., 2011ab), they have provided a measurement of 
economic growth adjusted for inequality.  In principle, they rely on the Ianchovichina and 
Gable (2011) conception of inclusive growth and a definition of inclusiveness that entails 
employment transitions, market protection, equity and equal opportunities. The adopted 
concept of inclusive growth consists of increasing growth and expanding the economy 
through level playing grounds for employment, growing investment and productivity. The 
measurement provided is consistent with the absolute pro-poor definition of inclusive growth, 
which sustains that growth is inclusive in so far as the poor benefit from it in absolute terms 
(Ravallion & Chen, 2003). The authors have argued that relative pro-poor growth which 
mitigates inequality by benefiting the poor more (Dollar & Kraay, 2002) may engender 
suboptimal consequences for majority households (poor & non-poor).  
 Mlachila et al. (2014) have reconciled the concept, definition and measurement of pro-
poor growth by: the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), Ianchovichina and 
Gable (2012) and Anand et al. (2013) respectively into a new indicator of ‘quality of growth’. 
According to the authors, this common denominator of pro-poor growth is all-encompassing 
in the perspective of growth that is socially friendly, durable and high: “good quality growth”. 
The indicator which derives from Martinez and Mlachila (2013) on the quality of high-growth 
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in sub-Saharan Africa argues that high growth in many countries over the past decades has not 
been accompanied with substantial mitigation of unemployment, inequality and poverty 
(Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Dollar et al., 2013).  Hence certain characteristics are needed for 
growth to be of quality, inter alia: stability, strength, sustainability, growing productivity and 
socially appealing results like poverty mitigation and higher living standards. Therefore, this 
study adopts the Mlachila et al. (2014) QGI in the empirics because it combines the intrinsic 
nature of growth with its social dimensions.  
The foundation for these empirics is also consistent with a growing body of literature 
which has been motivated by the intuition that applied econometrics should not be limited to 
mere acceptance or refutation of existing theories and practices (Constantini & Lupi, 2005, p. 
2; Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2772 ; Asongu, 2014a, p. 336).  
We are very aware of the risks of performing measurements on unpublished papers. 
However we argue that applied econometrics should not be exclusively limited to the 
extension of published papers. We postulate that extending unpublished papers is also a useful 
scientific activity. Therefore, the study steers clear of a mainstream informal consensus which 
suggests that only inquiries positioned on extending published papers are most likely to be 
published in reputable scientific media6. Hence, this empirical exercise also doubles in 
tackling the highlighted issue of publication bias.  
 There are at last three other logical justifications for extending the underlying study: 
reputation of publication medium, nearness to deadline of the MDGs and characteristics of 
published data. First, the IMF Working Paper Series is peer-reviewed. Hence, the published 
working paper could also be construed as a published journal article. Second, nearness to the 
MDGs deadline implies that researchers cannot afford to wait for the motivating paper to be 
published in a journal before exploiting the underlying data to provide policy implications 
                                                 
6
 This is a postulate by the authors.  
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relevant for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development. Third, some published data by 
international multilateral institutions may not be forwarded for further publication in 
mainstream journals because they are primarily meant for internal use. Hence, it is only 
scientifically correct for external researchers to use the available data in further assessing 
internal findings that are fundamentally used for wide (or global) policy initiatives.  
While most empirical papers published in top tier journals are fundamentally based on 
extending previously published papers, our perspective on this line of inquiry is simply to 
follow and understand. Theoretically, the present scientific inquiry further highlights  the 
relevance of a crucial policy issue: inclusive human development. By this assertion we do not 
undermine the value of published papers. Our predominant preoccupation is that applied 
econometrics should be given a broader scope and not restricted to published papers which 
may sometimes be characterized with errors.  
 Accordingly, mainstream consensus should not limit empirics to merely 
refuting/confirming the conclusions of previously published papers. Some published papers 
may be too vaguely positioned for practical assessment (Granger, 1999). Empirics in 
econometrics should have more practical goals (Franses, 2002). The assessed results from 
published papers may not necessarily be the most interesting (Summers, 1991, p. 129). 
Moreover, there could even be disturbing incidences when published papers conceal 
observations from the scientific community (Constantini & Lupi, 2005).  
  In light of above reasons, we do not position the current inquiry as a direct extension 
of a published paper. Instead, we aim to exploit new database, freshly available to the 
scientific community in assessing some important, urgent and pressing issues. The deep 
concerns that matter to us are the practical questions highlighted in the introduction. The 
positioning of the inquiry steers clear of recent policy  studies on inclusive human 
development literature which have focused on, inter alia: employment protection and wage 
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inequality (Perugini & Pompei, 2016); perspectives on inclusive and sustainable development 
in emerging markets (Stiglitz, 2016); economic inequality and optimal redistribution through 
taxation (Yunker, 2016); the relationship between poverty and deprivation (Renuka  &  Viet-
Ngu, 2016);  the redistributive effect of regulation in developing countries (Atsu  & Adams, 
2015); gender equality (Baliamoune-Lutz & McGillivray, 2009; Anyanwu, 2013a; Elu & 
Loubert, 2013; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Anyanwu, 2014a), rural-urban inequality 
(Baliamoune-Lutz & Lutz, 2005), poverty relationships (Anyanwu, 2013b, 2014b), nexuses 
between finance, growth, employment and poverty (Odhiambo, 2009, 2011), the relevance  of 
financial development in poverty reduction (Odhiambo, 2010a, 2010b, 2013) and linkages 
between human development, information technology and mobile banking in inclusive 
development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and fundamental characteristics  
 We assess a sample of ninety-three developing countries for the period 1990-2011 
with data from Mlachila et al (2014)7. The data consists of non-overlapping interval averages: 
1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-20118 The variables defined include: the Quality 
of Growth Index (dependent variable), education spending, health spending, government 
stability, inflation, private domestic credit, foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, 
foreign aid, rule of law and quality of bureaucracy. As emphasized in the motivation of this 
paper, there are two differences in the choice of variables with respect to the underlying 
study: (1) we decompose the social spending indicator into its health and educational 
                                                 
7
 The authors obtain their variables from various sources, inter alia: the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, 
COMTRADE, Xala-i-Martin (2006),  Barro & Lee (2010) & the World Bank Development Indicators.  
8
 The Mlachila et al (2014) dataset has been recently employed in the development literature, notably; in: 
assessing inclusive development throughout the conditional distribution of inclusive development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a), investigating the relationship between mobile banking and inclusive development (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2017) and examining the role of trust in quality of growth (Asongu & Gupta, 2016).  
11 
 
components and (2) we do not include two variables (aggregate institutional quality and 
corruption-control) because of their potentially high correlation with the rule of law indicator.  
 The independent variables of interest which are broadly consistent with Anand et al 
(2013, p. 16) are expected to have positive effects on the dependent variable for the most part. 
Discussing the expected signs to elaborate detail could be construed as a repetition of the 
underlying study and also Anand et al (2013). Justifications provided by these authors for the 
variables build on an interesting stream of pro-poor growth literature (Anand et al., 2012; 
IMF, 2007; Barro & Lee, 2000; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Hausmann, et al., 2007; Mishra, et al., 
2011; Calderon & Servén, 2004; Levine, 2005; Seneviratne &  Sun, 2013)9. Full definition of 
the variables, summary statistics, correlation matrix and categorization of countries are 
presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively. The 
summary statistics of the variables show that indicators are comparable and have high degrees 
of variations. Hence, we can be confident that significant connections would emerge.  
 The categorization of countries is based on five criteria from the underlying study 
which represents seventeen  fundamental characteristics. This enables us to complement the 
issue of heterogeneity in determinants which are articulated in Table 3 The vital features or 
homogenous panels are retrieved from Figures 2-3 and Figure 4 of the underlying study. 
These include: non-overlapping intervals (1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-2011); 
regions (Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Asia & the Pacific 
(AP), Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and Latin America (LA)); income levels (Low-income 
(LIC), Middle-income (MIC), Lower-middle-income (LMIC) and Upper-middle-income 
(UMIC); resource-wealth (Resource-rich [RR]), Resource-poor [RP]); State fragility (Fragile 
                                                 
9
 Consistent with Anand et al. (2013) and the IMF (2007), structural change, human capital and macroeconomic 
stability are crucial drivers of pro-poor growth in developing countries. Structural change includes globalisation, 
FDI and trade openness while the other two constitute documented determinants in the convergence literature 
like technological change, fixed investment and educational levels. Other structural factors and macroeconomic 
fundamentals include moderate output volatility and inflation (Barro & Lee, 2000; Dollar & Kraay, 2003), 
general financial development (Levine, 2005), moving-up the commodity value chain (Anand, et al., 2012; 
Hausmann et al., 2007), modernization of manufacturing (Mishra et al., 2011) and improvement of 
infrastructural quality (Calderon & Servén, 2004; Seneviratne & Sun, 2013). 
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[Frag] and Non-Fragile (Non-Fragile) countries) and GQ performance (Hopefuls [Hope]), 
Contenders [Cont] and Best performers [Best]).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
As highlighted in the introduction, the analytical procedure here entails two main 
steps.  
First, the catch-up and convergence patterns are investigated using beta and sigma 
methodologies for panel and cross-sectional specifications respectively. Both the absolute and 
conditional versions of beta convergence are provided. Due to some inherent issues in the 
computation of catch-up dynamics10, we complement the beta convergence GMM approach 
with a less criticised estimation technique of sigma convergence11. The latter procedure for 
identifying gaps is consistent with two dimensions of the title: ‘benchmarking and policy 
syndromes’.  
Second, benchmarking and ‘identification of gaps’ are used to provide the policy 
syndromes much needed for heterogeneous policy initiatives. The procedure consists of first 
identifying fundamental characteristics with the best QGI across non-overlapping intervals. 
Then, assessing QGI gaps between the benchmark and sub-panels (for all non-overlapping 
intervals). Finally, the high identified gaps represent the great policy syndromes requiring 
more policy attention.  
The following are steps in the estimation process. 
Step 1: Beta catch-up  
                                                 
10
 The four non-overlapping intervals (NOIs) used by authors of the underling study (Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 13) 
are non homogenous, notably: 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-2011. While the NOI in the first-three 
ranges is five, the last range has a seven-year NOI. Hence, using the proposed GMM empirical strategy to 
provide fresh patterns (convergence rates/half lives, time to full convergence…etc) appears difficult because the 
coefficient of autoregression ( ) is not constant. 
11
 The advantages of sigma convergence over beta catch-up have been substantially documented. For instance, 
the latter has more caveats due to issues of initial endowments and multiple equilibria (Asongu, 2014a; Monfort, 
2008, p. 4-5; Asongu, 2015a, p. 20).  
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According to Fung (2009), Eqs (1) and (2) are standard techniques for estimation beta 
convergence. 
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Where: tiQGI ,
 
 is the Quality of Growth index for country i
 
at period t ; is a constant,
 
W  is 
the vector of determinants, t
 
is the time-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  Accordingly, 
1 
 
and, conditions for convergence are    <0 in Eq. (1) and  10    in Eq. (2). 
However tW  which needs to exhibit strict exogeneity for convergence to take place is 
endogenous12. We use the procedure suggested by Arellano & Bond (1991) in exploiting all 
orthogonality conditions between the lagged QGI indicators and the error terms. We prefer 
the System to the Difference estimator (Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4) and specify it as a two-step 
(instead of one-step) procedure because it is consistent with heteroscedasticity 
(homoscedasticity). The estimation procedure combines Eq (2) above with Eq. (3) below 
which is in first-difference terms.   
  

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Absolute or unconditional convergence is estimated with only the lagged endogenous variable 
as exogenous indicator while conditional convergence is specified including the vector W as 
exogenous variables.  
Step 2: Sigma or cross-sectional convergence (Panel A of Table 3) 
 
                                                 
12
 The Hausman test for endogeneity can be provided upon request to the authors.  
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The procedure for estimating sigma convergence denoted by Eq (4) consists of observing the 
evolution in standard deviations of non-overlapping intervals across time. A decreasing 
tendency implies convergence.  
 
4. Empirical Results: Catch-up and Convergence in the Quality of Growth 
Tables 1 and 2 below present results for absolute and conditional catch-up based on Eqs (2) 
and (3). The underlying study has reported catch-up betas (  ) of -0.066 and -0.068 for the 
full sample to confirm evidence of convergence. We have reported the lagged endogenous 
estimates ( ) without any transformation13. Hence, since, 1 
 
and conditions for 
convergence are  <0 or 10   , our results in Tables 1 and 2 are broadly consistent with 
the findings of the underlying study14. It is important to note however that the convergence 
patterns are heterogeneous across fundamental characteristics. This is the case for both 
absolute (Table 1) and conditional (Table 2) convergence dynamics.  
There are four major shortcomings that limit our reliance on the beta convergence 
results for policy recommendations. First, we are unable to report the AR(2) test for the 
absence of autocorrelation and estimation beyond a one lag structure renders the matrices ‘not 
positive definite’ due to issues in degrees of freedom. Second, the issues in degrees of 
freedom are further confirmed because some of the conditional estimations are not feasible 
when all the conditioning information set (or control variables) are considered. Third, we 
                                                 
13
 Accordingly,    could also be directly reported (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & 
Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23). 
14
 While the absolute convergence findings of the full sample are broadly consistent, differences in the findings 
of conditional convergence may be traceable to the conditioning information set (or control variables) which is 
(are) not disclosed by the underlying study.  
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contacted the IMF to get raw data on which the QGI is based, but we were told that due to 
issues in degrees of freedom, the dataset that is publicly available is only based on non-
overlapping intervals15. Fourth, we have also seen above that beta convergence has 
shortcomings relative to the sigma convergence approach. Moreover, the computations of 
policy syndromes are consistent with the latter approach. Though our policy implications 
substantially draw from the sigma convergence results, we have nonetheless reported the beta 
convergence findings to unlock the file drawer problem and tackle issues of publication bias 
in social sciences: of strong results against null results (Franco et al., 1991; Rosenberg, 2005). 
The focus on sigma convergence for policy implications is consistent with Asongu (2017a, 
2017b) who has also preferred the sigma to the beta approach.  
 
                                                 
15
 We can provide correspondence e-mails upon request.  
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Table 1: Absolute convergence (Panel). Dependent variable: logQGI 
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Initial 0.788*** 0.86*** 0.707*** -0.042 0.618** 0.702*** 0.62** 0.773*** 0.621* 0.774*** 0.865*** 0.901*** 0.896*** 0.718*** 0.923*** 0.470*** 0.897*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) (0.012) (0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) -1.070 0.465 -1.731 -0.245 -1.121 -0.866 -1.672* -1.611 -1.550 -1.110 -1.010 -0.506 -1.684* -1.120 -0.664 -1.925* -1.540 
 (0.284) (0.641) (0.083) (0.806) (0.262) (0.386) (0.094) (0.107) (0.121) (0.266) (0.312) (0.612) (0.092) (0.262) (0.506) (0.054) (0.123) 
AR(2) na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 
                  
Sargan 6.606 5.387 2.334 9.645** 5.033 5.526 9.844** 4.603 6.364 2.489 12.306** 5.074 5.177 4.998 2.561 31.55*** 9.530** 
 (0.158) (0.249) (0.674) (0.046) (0.283) (0.237) (0.043) (0.330) (0.173) (0.646) (0.015) (0.279) (0.269) (0.287) (0.633) (0.000) (0.049) 
Wald 10.86*** 81.36*** 91.76*** 0.001 6.228*** 9.765*** 5.247** 39.16*** 3.480* 123.3*** 38.43*** 29.46*** 346.2*** 12.80*** 11.0*** 3.787* 175.8*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) (0.012) (0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) 
Instruments 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
                  
Countries 36 10 12 16 17 36 57 35 22 34 59 14 79 33 16 44 93 
Observations  108 30 36 48 51 108 171 105 66 102 177 42 237 99 48 132 279 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable. AR(1): First-order Autocorrelation test.  AR(2): Second-order Autocorrelation test. Sargan: Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia 
& Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers.  
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Table 2: Conditional convergence (Panel) Dependent variable: logQGI  
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Initial 0.850** n.sa  nsa nsa nsa 0.832** 1.242*** 1.182*** nsa nsa 0.938*** nsa 1.163*** 0.520* nsa 0.827*** 1.221*** 
 (0.015)     (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.095)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.073     0.037 0.371 0.482   0.024  0.396 -0.376  0.056 0.467 
 (0.883)     (0.938) (0.179) (0.105)   (0.893)  (0.136) (0.336)  (0.699) (0.150) 
Edu. Spending 0.015     0.011 0.014 0.018*   0.014  0.008 0.032***  0.0002 0.009 
 (0.226)     (0.524) (0.063) (0.058)   (0.201)  (0.252) (0.000)  (0.980) (0.224) 
Health Spending -0.033*     -0.033* -0.030 -0.050**   -0.024*  -0.024*** -0.04***  0.0006 -0.025*** 
 (0.056)     (0.089) (0.136) (0.032)   (0.061)  (0.004) (0.000)  (0.948) (0.007) 
Govt. Stab -0.020     -0.016 -0.010 -0.018**   -0.008  -0.008 -0.019*  0.004 -0.009 
 (0.246)     (0.151) (0.545) (0.028)   (0.518)  (0.322) (0.052)  (0.557) (0.255) 
Inflation(log) 0.034     -0.0001 -0.007 -0.020   0.020  0.0003 0.044  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.242)     (0.998) (0.456) (0.117)   (0.333)  (0.985) (0.159)  (0.768) (0.920) 
Credit(log) -0.051     -0.013 -0.022 -0.019   -0.034*  -0.048** 0.004  -0.032 -0.056* 
 (0.349)     (0.776) (0.440) (0.545)   (0.054)  (0.036) (0.874)  (0.114) (0.059) 
FDI -0.0007     -0.002 0.010** 0.010**   -0.0004  0.003 -0.003  0.001 0.004 
 (0.920)     (0.708) (0.013) (0.013)   (0.928)  (0.250) (0.621)  (0.580) (0.207) 
Remittances  -0.003     -0.010 0.003 0.006   0.004  0.001 0.006  0.0009 0.0007 
 (0.668)     (0.423) (0.409) (0.059)   (0.216)  (0.508) (0.412)  (0.423) (0.756) 
Foreign Aid  -0.007     -0.002 0.002 0.001   0.003  0.004 -0.005  -0.005*** 0.005 
 (0.283)     (0.790) (0.725) (0.530)   (0.405)  (0.374) (0.387)  (0.000) (0.356) 
Rule of Law 0.058**     0.035 -0.0008 -0.0005   0.029**  0.021* 0.015  0.005 0.023* 
 (0.046)     (0.341) (0.948) (0.943)   (0.015)  (0.050) (0.416)  (0.497) (0.052) 
Bureaucracy  -0.022     0.002 -0.022 -0.043**   -0.004  -0.051** 0.038  -0.010 -0.050** 
 (0.632)     (0.941) (0.456) (0.086)   (0.718)  (0.026) (0.351)  (0.502) (0.035) 
                  
AR(1) -0.502     -0.370 -0.825 -0.759   -0.484  -0.455 -1.152  1.620 -0.167 
 (0.615)     (0.710) (0.409) (0.447)   (0.628)  (0.649) (0.249)  (0.105) (0.867) 
AR(2) na     na na na   na  na na  na na 
                  
Sargan 2.482     4.009 3.043 0.407   5.638  0.904 0.611  11.952** 1.429 
 (0.647)     (0.404) (0.550) (0.981)   (0.227)  (0.923) (0.961)  (0.017) (0.839) 
Wald 459.8***     126.3*** 536.3*** 2970***   2661***  470.2*** 964.7***  1203*** 401*** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments 18     18 18 18   18  18 18  18 18 
                  
Countries 17     19 18 16   26  36 15  15 37 
Observations  47     52 43 39   68  92 42  35 95 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable. AR(1): First-order Autocorrelation test.  AR(2): Second-order Autocorrelation test. Sargan: Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia 
& Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers. Edu: Education. Gov’t Stab: Government Stability. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent. n.sa: not specifically applicable due to shortage in degrees of freedom (matrix is not positive definite). Log: logarithm.  
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Table 3: Sigma convergence, benchmarking, gaps and policy syndromes  
                  
 Panel A: Standard deviations (Dispersions within) 
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
1990-1994 0.103 0.101 0.117 0.056 0.063 0.109 0.087 0.089 0.061 0.145 0.139 0.090 0.135 0.076 0.055 0.050 0.141 
1995-1999 0.100 0.112 0.091 0.047 0.044 0.119 0.087 0.093 0.056 0.146 0.140 0.118 0.131 0.079 0.061 0.045 0.142 
2000-2004 0.089 0.108 0.076 0.036 0.044 0.118 0.090 0.097 0.064 0.141 0.133 0.124 0.124 0.072 0.060 0.050 0.136 
2005-2011 0.084 0.106 0.059 0.046 0.047 0.108 0.087 0.094 0.060 0.136 0.113 0.107 0.109 0.069 0.039 0.046 0.123 
                  
 Panel B: Benchmarking QGI (Highest Performers): Means 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
1990-1994 0.422 0.574 0.655 0.644 0.670 0.462 0.638 0.608 0.686 0.532 0.570 0.420 0.580 0.398 0.543 0.679 0.556 
1995-1999 0.446 0.604 0.688 0.690 0.700 0.459 0.667 0.641 0.709 0.567 0.598 0.440 0.613 0.422 0.598 0.706 0.587 
2000-2004 0.478 0.632 0.710 0.738 0.717 0.503 0.690 0.665 0.729 0.593 0.631 0.479 0.642 0.458 0.644 0.727 0.617 
2005-2011 0.534 0.671 0.751 0.748 0.748 0.559 0.718 0.695 0.754 0.629 0.672 0.517 0.681 0.512 0.686 0.754 0.656 
                  
 Panel C: Gaps with Highest Performers (Dispersions Between based on Standard deviation of Means) 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
1990-1994 0.187 0.079 0.022 0.030 0.011 0.158 0.034 0.055 0.000 0.109 0.082 0.188 0.075 0.204 0.101 0.005 0.092 
1995-1999 0.186 0.074 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.177 0.030 0.048 0.000 0.100 0.078 0.190 0.068 0.203 0.078 0.002 0.086 
2000-2004 0.184 0.075 0.020 0.000 0.015 0.166 0.034 0.052 0.006 0.103 0.076 0.183 0.068 0.198 0.066 0.008 0.086 
2005-2011 0.156 0.059 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.138 0.025 0.042 0.000 0.088 0.058 0.168 0.052 0.171 0.048 0.000 0.069 
                  
 Panel D: Policy Syndromes 
                  
       Policy Syndromes -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  Syndrome   Free  
                  
1990-1994 Hope Frag SSA LIC RR Cont Sample RP MENA NFrag LMIC MIC CEE AP LA Best UMIC 
1995-1999 Hope Frag SSA LIC RR Sample RP Cont MENA NFrag LMIC MIC AP CEE LA Best UMIC 
2000-2004 Hope SSA Frag LIC RR Sample RP MENA NFrag Cont LMIC MIC AP LA Best UMIC CEE 
2005-2011 Hope  Frag SSA LIC RR Sample MENA RP NFrag Cont LMIC MIC CEE LA AP UMIC Best 
                  
 Highest Dispersions (Gaps)  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----  Lowest Dispersions (Gaps) 
                  
90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia & Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. 
LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. 
Best: Best Performers. QGI: Quality of Growth Index. Bold numbers in Panel B denote benchmarks.  
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Table 3 presents the sigma convergence findings (Panel A). The benchmarking 
procedure based on means of fundamental characteristics for corresponding NOIs (Panel B). 
QGI gaps are computed as the difference between the highest performer (or benchmark) 
within a NOI and fundamental characteristics (Panel C). Policy syndromes depend on the 
degrees of dispersions or differences (Panel D)16. Figure 1 below presents the QGI dispersions 
based on regions, income levels, resource availability and  state fragility and performance 
over time. The following are noticeable. 
 First, QGI dispersions within fundamental characteristics have been decreasing over 
time. The slight exception is Central and  Eastern Europe (CEE) which has witnessed 
increasing differences in QGI distributions during the last periodic interval (2005-2011). 
Second, from a time-dynamic view, countries within the Asia and the Pacific (AP) have 
experienced the highest reduction in GQ differences while countries in the MENA (CEE) 
have witnessed the highest (lowest) differences, based on a regional assessment. Third, from 
an income perspective, Upper-middle-income (Low-income) countries have the lowest 
(highest) differences in QGI.  Fourth, Resource-rich and Non-fragile countries have higher 
differences relative to their Resource-poor and Fragile counterparts respectively. Fifth, as 
expected, in the ‘performance over-time’ criterion, differences are highest in the Hopefuls and 
lowest in the Best Performers, with Contenders in the middle.  
It should be noted that the above narratives are relevant for dispersions within 
fundamental characteristics. In order to ascertain the policy syndromes, we proceed to 
assessing dispersions between the fundamental features. This requires the benchmarking 
exercise (Panel B) in which the benchmark is the sub-panel with the highest GQI in terms of 
means for every NOI. ‘Between dispersions’17 in means are then employed to assess gaps 
                                                 
16
 Fosu (2013) from whom the term is borrowed has defined ‘policy syndromes’ as negative features to 
economic prosperity.  
17
 ‘Between dispersions’ here implies differences between fundamental characteristics. The beta catch-up and 
sigma convergence dispersions have been ‘within fundamental characteristics’.  
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with the benchmarks (Panel C). From this exercise, the dispersions are classified in decreasing 
order, with the highest representing the most critical/important policy syndromes (Panel D).  
Figure 1: Sigma Convergence (QGI Dispersions) 
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The identified policy syndromes in terms of regions, income levels, resources & fragility and 
performance over time are illustrated in Figure 2 below.  While the policy syndromes are not 
time-consistent, certain characteristics which are apparent from both extremities are broadly 
consistent over time (see Panel D). In decreasing need of policy intervention, the following 
are apparent for the policy syndrome extreme: Hopeful, Fragile, Sub-Saharan African, Low-
income & Resource-rich countries.  In the same line of inference, the following are apparent 
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for the Syndrome-free extreme: Central and Eastern European, Asia and the Pacific, Latin 
American, Best Performing and Upper-middle-income countries.  
Figure 2: Policy Syndromes 
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5. Concluding implications  
 
The above study has provided, within and between ‘Quality of Growth Index’ (QGI) 
dispersions with particular emphasis on the fundamental characteristics identified in Mlachila 
et al. (2014). The underlying study has left room for improvement in three main areas which 
we have identified and discussed in the introduction. The deep concerns that have mattered to 
us have been four practical question: (1) Are determinants of growth quality (GQ) different 
across fundamental characteristics of development in developing countries? (2) What are the 
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convergence and catch-up dynamics in GQ within fundamental panels? (3) What are the gaps 
between fundamental panels when benchmarked with best performers? (4) What are the 
resulting policy syndromes? Beta catch-up and sigma convergence techniques have been 
employed on data from ninety-three developing countries for the period 1990-2011.  
For within dispersions that are based on beta and sigma findings, the following have 
been established. First, the QGI dispersions within fundamental characteristics have been 
decreasing over time. Second, from a time-dynamic view, countries within the Asia and the  
Pacific region have experienced the highest reduction in GQ differences while countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa: MENA (Central and Eastern Europe: CEE) have witnessed the 
highest (lowest) differences based on a regional assessment. Third, from an income 
perspective, Upper-middle-income (Low-income) countries have the lowest (highest) 
differences in the QGI. Fourth, Resource-rich and Non-fragile countries have higher 
differences relative to their Resource-poor and Fragile counterparts respectively. 
Concerning between dispersions and policy syndromes, we have found that in 
decreasing need of policy intervention, the following are apparent for the policy syndrome 
extreme: Hopeful, Fragile, Sub-Saharan African, Low-income & Resource-rich countries.  In 
the same line of policy inference, the following are apparent for the syndrome-free extreme: 
Central and Eastern European, Asia and the Pacific, Latin American, Best Performing and 
Upper-middle-income countries. These syndromes differ from those presented by the 
underlying study in at least three main ways. First, contrary to the static picture presented by 
the underlying study, our evidence is time-dynamic with more fundamental characteristics. 
Second, we have presented a broad comparative picture, as opposed to segmented 
perspectives with differing Full sample averages. Third, we devote space to discussing how 
the identified syndromes are reflected in the inclusive development literature in five main 
strands.  
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First, the evidence that Sub-Saharan Africa is a substantial policy syndrome in growth 
quality runs counter to recent narratives of the continent being on time for certain Millennium 
Development Poverty targets (Pinkivskiy &  Sala-i-Martin, 2014). This is essentially because, 
other descriptions have sustained that  growth miracle (Young, 2012) is being marred by 
burgeoning inequality (Blas, 2014) despite a growing middle class (Shimeles   &  Ncube, 
2015; Ncube et al., 2011, 2014; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016). It should be noted that 
immiserizing growth may entail a burgeoning middle-class that is accompanied by negative 
income-inequality externalities18. Despite evidence of a decline in African poverty relative to 
other regions in the World, the argument depends on periodicity: 1980-2010 versus 1995-
2010 (Fosu, 2015). According to Fosu, only findings of the latter period (1995-2010) which 
have been characterised by growth resurgence substantiate the thesis of declining African 
poverty relative to other world regions. This inference is broadly consistent with Alan & 
Carlyn (2015) on African countries catching-up with the USA only after the mid-1990s. 
Hence, the periodicity of 1990-2011 used in this paper could partly elucidate these contrasting 
narratives. Moreover, the indicator used to measure extreme poverty also matters because 
while Pinkivskiy &  Sala-i-Martin (2014) have measured extreme poverty as below $1 a day  
and have concluded that most African countries reached the MDG extreme poverty target, 
more contemporary literature suggests the contrary (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).  
Second, the policy syndrome of Resource-rich countries is substantially based on the 
mismanagement of resource wealth and capital flight. For instance, while growth in 
developing countries is substantially driven by Resource-rich countries, it is  also 
characterised by very low social and health ratings. For example, consistent with Ndikumana 
& Boyce (2012), while the Republic of Congo, Gabon and  Equatorial Guinea are among the 
                                                 
18
 The interested reader can refer to Moyo (2013) on why the Beijing model may not be a sustainable 
development model. This is essentially because, while it has delivered a burgeoning middle class within a record 
time, it has also done so at the price of rising inequality. This is consistent with the concluding implications of 
Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2014).  
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wealthiest nations in Africa with per capita incomes of $1,253 (15th), $4,176 (5th) and $8,649 
(2nd) respectively and massive reserves in oil (ranking, 10th [Equatorial Guinea]), 8th (Congo) 
and 7th [Gabon]), the majority of citizens in these countries are living in abject poverty. They 
lack access to decent sanitation and basic social services, health care, elementary schools and 
drinkable water. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon rank third and second to the last with 51 
percent and 55 percent respectively in the rate of immunizing their population against 
measles. Moreover, a child born in Equatorial Guinea has odds  against reaching a fifth 
birthday, which is higher than the sub-Saharan African average. A close look at the QGI 
rankings in the underlying paper (p. 27) confirms our stylized facts. A time-dynamic 
assessment of the performance of these countries for total of 93 developing nations from 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 & 2005-2011, reveals a substantial deterioration in 
rankings: Gabon (58th, 61st, 67th & 69th); Congo Republic (59th, 70th, 74th & 84th) and 
Equatorial Guinea (76th, 73rd, 76th  & 88th).  
 Third, the findings on Fragile states and Low-income countries are consistent with 
intuition. While the former naturally reduces tax revenues and domestic investments, the latter 
is characterised by a lack of financial means needed for basic educational and social 
investments.  
 Fourth, the featuring of Latin American and Asia and  the Pacific countries as quasi 
Syndrome-free, is consistent with the inclusive development literature (Young, 2012; Asongu, 
2016; Fosu, 2015). Accordingly, economic growth between 1980 and 2010 has been 
accompanied by varying regional changes in poverty and inequality levels. Latin American 
and South East Asian nations have experienced slow growth and substantial inequality 
reduction, while  MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced growing inequality. 
 Fifth, the position of High-income countries is broadly in line with the conclusions of 
Tebaldi and Mohan (2010). Since the quality of institutions has been established as driving 
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growth quality, the hypothesis that institutions may lead to growth quality (or poverty 
mitigation) through income-average as opposed to income-equality is broadly confirmed. This 
inference which is the object of debate may naturally constitute an interesting future line of 
inquiry. The Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) findings are currently subject to criticisms based on 
more holistic poverty indicators and evolving currents and debates from post-2010 literature 
(Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017).  
After identifying the policy syndromes, the natural question that arises is how policy 
can act on them to reduce cross-country differences in growth quality. But before we engage 
in how to address the identified policy syndromes, it is first of all worthwhile  discussing why 
it is important for policy to act towards decreasing dispersions in growth quality. First, 
consistent with the underpinnings for cross-country common policy initiatives (Asongu, 
2013b; Asongu, 2014b), decreasing differences in growth quality among countries implies 
that common policy initiatives among these states are feasible while complete elimination of 
cross-country differences suggests that such common initiatives can be applied without 
distinction of nationality.  Second, the need for common policy initiatives substantially draws 
on the post-2015 development agenda which clearly articulates the need for harmonized 
growth quality (Anand et al., 2013; United Nations, 2013).  
 Addressing the policy syndromes would require, inter alia, tackling concerns 
associated with structural and institutional differences among countries that are inhibiting the 
convergence process. It would be out of scope to discuss all the determinants of Quality of 
Growth in detail because they have already been thoroughly covered in the literature 
discussed above (Mlachila et al., 2014;  Anand et al., 2013). With this scope in mind, we have 
positioned the present inquiry essentially on: first, presenting within and between tendencies 
in growth quality dispersions and then identifying the resulting policy syndromes. The reader 
can explore literature on determinants of quality of growth in Section 2 of this paper. While 
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discussing determinants could be construed as a repetition of what Mlachila et al. (2014) have 
already documented, it would however be interesting to deal with the two negative 
determinants: inflation and foreign aid. We devote space to discussing these two because the 
underlying paper has provided no explanation on how these could be reinvented to promote 
growth quality.  
 First, how can we fight inflation to boost the quality of growth? The relevant literature 
argues that monetary and exchange rate policy responses were ineffective at addressing the 
2008 food price inflation (Asongu, 2013c, p. 41). This is consistent with the narrative of the 
Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute (Von Braum, 2008). 
Hence, national food security strategies are essential because globalization and current 
policies of trade are substantially undermining livelihoods (Asongu & Nguena, 2015; 
Osabuohien, 2014). An interesting literature on how to address food policy issues resulting 
from foreign land acquisitions has been documented by Osabuohien (2015).  
 Second, foreign aid could contribute to inclusive growth by orientating less developed 
countries towards industrialization not in the perspective of Kuznets (1955), but in the view of 
Piketty (2014). Hence, by focusing more on inequality instead of GDP growth, the negative 
effect of foreign aid on growth quality would become positive. This intuition is fundamentally 
based on the findings of Fosu discussed in the introduction: the effect of growth on poverty is 
a decreasing function of inequality because the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than 
the growth elasticity of poverty19.   
On policy lessons that peripheral countries in terms of quality of growth can learn 
from frontier countries, two facts are apparent from the QGI classifications. On the one hand, 
China was on average the best performing frontier country during the period 2004 to 2011. 
On the other hand, Chad and the Central African Republic are the worst performing countries 
                                                 
19
 The reader can have brief insights into the economics of foreign aid for inclusive human development in 
Asongu (2014c).  
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for the same period and, by extension, most bottom performing countries are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Two resulting important questions are relevant for policy:  are the QGI performance 
measures from Mlachila et al (2014) consistent with recent literature based on data closer to 
our time and what are the lessons of China to Sub-Saharan African countries?  
 With  regard to the first question, the statistics from the Mlachila et al. (2014) are 
consistent with more contemporary literature because a recent World Bank report on the 
MDG extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world with the exception of Africa where close to 50 percent of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa were substantially off-course from achieving the MDG extreme poverty 
target, despite the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016a). The benefits of globalization over the past decades in developing 
countries have fundamentally been reaped by China.  
 Concerning the second question, a valuable lesson for laggard countries in growth 
quality is that prioritizing economic governance over political governance, as China has done 
over the past decades, could lead to more inclusive growth. Political governance is the 
election and replacement of political leaders while economic governance is the formulation 
and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016b). Hence, by prioritizing economic governance over political governance, most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa can improve avenues of increasing inclusive growth in the 
post-2015 sustainable development era20. By extension, such priority in economic governance 
cannot be fully respected when conditions for delivering public services, increasing social 
mobility and decreasing unemployment vulnerability are not conducive to this.  Accordingly, 
civil wars and political strife have characterized the least performing countries which we have 
                                                 
20
 For brevity and lack of space, we invite the reader to consult Asongu and Ssozi (2016) for the relevant 
literature motivating this policy inference. These authors have surveyed more than 110 studies on Sino-African 
relations to define the model applied by China as encompassing three main features: de-emphasized democracy,  
state capitalism and priority in economic rights.  
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highlighted (i.e. Chad and the Central African Republic) over the past decades. Peace is 
essential for quality of growth.  Therefore, it is no coincidence that during the sample 
periodicity most of the conflict-torn countries in the world were in SSA21.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 “In summary, seven of the nine cases of total chaos and societal breakdowns known in recent history have 
been registered in Africa (with the exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria): Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Zaire/Congo, Somalia, and Sudan ” (Asongu, 2014d, p. 1569). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
 
Quality of Growth 
Index (QGI) 
“Composite index ranging between 0 and 1, resulting from the 
aggregation of components capturing growth fundamentals and from 
components capturing the socially-friendly nature of growth. The 
higher the index, the greater is the quality of growth” (p. 25). 
 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
 
   
Educational 
Spending 
“Public resources allocated to education spending, as percent of GDP” 
(p. 25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Health Spending “Public resources allocated to heath spending, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Government 
Stability 
“Index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability of government 
to stay in office and to carry out its declared program(s).The higher 
the index, the more stable the government is” (p. 25). 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Inflation Inflation rate based on the Consumer Price  Index (CPI) Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Credit to private 
sector 
“Domestic credit to private sector, namely credit offered by the banks 
to the private sector, as percent of GDP” (p. 25).  
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
“Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments, as percent of GDP” (p. 25) Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
Remittances 
“Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (Percent of 
GDP), calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of 
employees and migrants' transfers” (p. 25).  
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Foreign Aid “Official development Aid actually disbursed, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
Rule of Law 
“Index assessing the strength and the impartiality of the legal system, 
as well as the popular observance of the law. The index ranges from 0 
to 6, with a higher value of the index reflecting a higher institutional 
Quality” (p. 25). 
 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Quality of 
Bureaucracy 
“Index of the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, 
ranging from 0 to 4. The higher the index, the stronger the quality of 
the bureaucracy” (p. 25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean S. D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Quality of Growth Index (QGI) 0.604 0.140 0.258 0.849 372 
Quality of Growth Index (QGI)(log) -0.535 0.260 -1.354 -0.163 372 
Educational Spending  0.612 0.263 0.000 1.000 372 
Health Spending 0.676 0.208 0.089 0.995 372 
Government Stability 18.518 165.55 2.666 2873.8 303 
Inflation (log) 2.331 1.358 -0.637 8.767 339 
Domestic Credit (log) 3.355 0.798 0.529 5.131 345 
Foreign Direct Investment 3.225 4.867 -4.172 62.264 366 
Remittances 4.117 7.391 0.001 63.295 322 
Foreign Aid 4.921 5.771 -9.546 36.317 226 
Rule of Law 3.290 1.060 0.666 5.933 301 
Quality of Bureaucracy 1.693 0.772 0.000 4.000 301 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
             
Educ Health GovStab Infl(log) Credit(log) FDI Remit Aid Law Bureau QGI QGI(log)  
1.000 0.594 0.024 -0.007 0.152 0.048 0.419 -0.014 0.219 0.214 0.098 0.119 Educ 
 1.000 0.036 0.032 0.231 0.133 0.265 -0.070 0.214 0.228 0.340 0.331 Health 
  1.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.050 -0.046 0.160 0.355 0.025 -0.119 -0.130 GovStab 
   1.000 -0.103 -0.111 -0.058 0.088 -0.100 -0.071 -0.003 0.015 Infl(log) 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.018 -0.230 0.235 0.464 0.551 0.539 Credit(log) 
     1.000 0.134 -0.062 0.130 -0.069 0.038 0.038 FDI 
      1.000 -0.027 -0.040 -0.058 -0.033 -0.020 Remit 
       1.000 -0.059 -0.304 -0.572 -0.581 Aid 
        1.000 0.256 0.352 0.347 Law 
         1.000 0.493 0.491 Bureau 
          1.000 0.991 QGI 
           1.000 QGI(log) 
             
Educ: Educational Spending. Health: Health Spending. GovStab: Government Stability. Infl: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Remit: Remittances. Aid: Foreign Aid. Law: Rule of Law. Bureau: Bureaucracy. QGI: Quality of Growth Index.  
 
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of countries  
    
Categories Panels Countries Number 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Levels  
 
 
 
Low Income 
“Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Zambia”. 
 
 
 
36 
   
 
 
 
 
Middle Income 
“Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, China, Cameroon, Congo 
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Algeria, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Sudan, El Salvador, 
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa”. 
 
 
 
 
57 
   
 
 
Lower Middle 
Income 
“Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, China, Cameroon, 
Congo Republic, Colombia, Djibouti, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Iran, Jordan, 
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, Sudan, El Salvador, 
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia” 
 
 
35 
   
 
Upper Middle 
Income 
“Argentina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, 
Malaysia, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa” 
 
22 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions  
Asia & Pacific “Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, 
Mongolia, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam”. 
12 
   
Central & 
Eastern Europe  
“Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan”. 
 
16 
   
 
Latin America 
“Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela”.  
 
17 
   
Middle East & “Djibouti, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, 10 
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North Africa Syria, Tunisia, Yemen”.  
   
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
“Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Central Africa 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, 
Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, South 
African, Congo Democratic Republic, Zambia”. 
 
 
 
36 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragility  
 
Fragile  
“Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo 
Republic, Georgia, Guinea, Nepal, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Chad, 
Togo, Tajikistan, Yemen, Congo Democratic Republic”.  
 
14 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non Fragile  
“Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, 
Chile, China, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Djibouti, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, El 
Salvador, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
South Africa, Zambia”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources  
 
 
Resource-rich 
“Albania, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cameroon, Congo Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Guinea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, 
Mexico, Mali, Mongolia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, 
Russia, Sudan, Syrian, Chad, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Congo Democratic Republic, Zambia”.  
 
 
 
34 
   
 
 
 
 
Non resource-
rich 
“Argentina, Armenia, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, Central African 
Republic, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, The Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Paraguay, Romania, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Swaziland, Togo, 
Thailand, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, South Africa”.   
 
 
 
 
59 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
 
 
 
Hopefuls  
“Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, Congo 
Democratic Republic”. 
 
 
 
33 
   
 
Contenders  
“Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Lao 
PDR, Morocco, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nepal, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Zambia”. 
 
16 
   
 
 
 
 
Best Performers 
“Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, 
Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Algeria,  
Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, El Salvador, Syria, 
 
 
 
44 
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Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
South Africa”. 
    
 
Non-
overlapping 
intervals  
1990-1994 Full Sample 93 
   
1995-1999 Full Sample 93 
   
2000-2004 Full Sample 93 
   
2005-2011 Full Sample 93 
    
The sub-regions which do not add-up to 93 are entirely an issue with the database of Mlachila et al. (2014) and not a 
calculation mistake by the authors.  
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